This paper investigates currency and financial crises in an optimizing general equilibrium model. It is shown that a rise in current and expected future budget deficits generates a real exchange rate appreciation and a decumulation of external assets, leading up to a currency crisis when foreign reserves approximate a critical level. Strong empirical support for our model is obtained by a probit estimation for Latin American and Asian countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
The events of the 90's have cast serious doubts on the validity of standard models of currency crises. The economic conditions in the Asian and Latin American countries did not appear to show the kind of macroeconomic and financial distress that typically is at the core of the traditional models of balance of payments crises. Alternative explanations have been provided by a new literature emphasizing moral hazard problems and financial panics. The moral hazard based models stress the role played by the government bailout promise in determining excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries. The channels through which this could have operated in emerging economies are poor banking regulations and the so called "carry trade", by which banks borrow in international markets at low interest rates and lend at higher rates at home (OECD, 1999, pp. 177-83) .
This resulted in a lending boom fuelled by large capital inflows, thereby generating overinvestment in risky projects and asset price bubbles. The bubble grew up until an adverse shock burst it, revealing the fragility of the banking system and generating a financial and currency crisis 1 .
Proponents of this view argue that if the bailout promise is at the core of moral hazard problems, then the only policy cure is to abolish the lender of last resort facilities .
The problem with the moral hazard view, as pointed out in Radelet and Sachs (1998, pp. 35-42) , is that the data in the early 1990s did not show a dramatic deterioration in either loan quality or investment riskiness for the crisis countries. Furthermore, spreads on Asian bonds fell between 1995 and 1997, and ratings of long term government bonds by Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Euromoney remained unchanged until the onset of the crisis, revealing that foreign lenders did not perceive an increase in risk. Finally, no warning of an asset price bubble was present in the reports of the investment houses,
showing that expectations of a financial crash and a subsequent bailout were absent 2 .
1 For an interpretation of financial crises in Southeast Asia along these lines see Calvo, et al. (1994) , McKinnon and Pill (1996) , Dooley (1997) , Corsetti et al. (1998 Corsetti et al. ( , 1999 , Krugman (1998) , and Chinn et al. (1999) , among others. 2 See also BIS (1997) , IMF (1998) . For a contrary view on the last point see, however, Sarno and Taylor (1999) .
The financial panic based models, on the other hand, stress self-fulfilling prophecies and herding behavior as the determinants of a crisis. According to this view, the crisis may be triggered by either rumors or fundamentals resulting in a massive withdrawal by investors attempting to avoid capital losses. This is rationalized by using multiple rational expectations equilibrium models where the financial panic represents a selffulfilling bad equilibrium leading to the collapse, along the lines sketched by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in the context of banking institutions. Crises are thus unavoidable and can occur even when countries show sound or non-deteriorating fundamentals 3 .
The key factor behind the sudden shifts in expectations is "the excess volatility " in international financial markets. Evidence may be found in the large and, to some extent, unanticipated swings of capital flows that played a critical role in pushing the emerging market economies into crises. The sharp reversal of capital flows from Latin American and Asian countries, respectively in 1994 and 1997, was the start of the currency and banking crises through herding behavior and contagion effects (e.g. Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999) . Proponents of this view argue that there is a strong rationale for an international lender of last resort, so that the crisis could be stopped and not be allowed to spread.
The problem with the financial panic view is that the data in the 1990s in many emerging countries do show macroeconomic imbalances, and this must have played some role in the subsequent crises (see, for example, OECD, 1999, pp. 183-91; Corsetti et al. ,1998) .
However, no satisfactory model based on fundamentals has been presented in the literature with the notable exceptions by Rebelo (2000, 2001) and Daniel (2000) who explain currency crises as the consequence of expected changes about the course of future policy. In particular, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo examine the role of large prospective budget deficits (associated with implicit bailout guarantees to banking systems) in the 1997 Asian currency crisis. Daniel explores how different combinations of expansionary future policies determine the timing of the exchange rate collapse.
In both models the collapse of the peg is driven by the increase in the present value of seignorage revenue associated with the change in expected future policies.
In this paper we present, on the other hand, a model of currency crises entirely based on fundamentals, where current account deficits brought about by current and prospective fiscal deficits push foreign reserves to a critical level, where the attack starts. The main result is that crises can occour even when both monetary and fiscal policy are correctly designed. There is no need for prospective seignorage revenue, since the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is always respected and monetary policy obeys the rules of the game. The conclusion is that the sustainability of fixed exchange rate system may require giving up both monetary and fiscal sovereignty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical model. Section III describes the dynamics of the model and the time of the speculative attack. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V contains the summary and conclusions of the paper.
II. THE OPTIMIZING MODEL
The semi-small open economy macromodel is composed of households, firms, and the government. There is no bequest motive, population is constant and lifetimes are uncertain as in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) . Agents maximize the discounted value of an expected utility function subject to the appropriate budget constraint. The utility function is logarithmic in aggregate consumption and real money balances 4 and labor supply is inelastic. Individuals ensure that the marginal rate of substitution 4 The approach of entering money in the utility function to allow for money holding behavior within a Yaari-Blanchard framework, is common to a number of papers including Spaventa (1987) , Marini and van der Ploeg (1988) , van der Ploeg (1991), Daniel (1993) , and Kawai and Maccini (1990, 1995) . Similar results could also be obtained by use of cash-in advance or liquidity cost models (see Feenstra 1986) . between consumption and real money balances equals the opportunity cost of holding real money balances (i.e. the nominal interest rate). Non-human wealth is the sum of government debt, capital stock, net foreign assets and real money balances.
In this economy, assumed to be operating under a fixed exchange rate regime, agents consume two physical goods, which we denote as H C (domestically produced good) and F C (foreign or imported good), so that total real consumption, C , can be written as
is the relative price of foreign goods in terms of domestic goods, or real exchange rate, e is the nominal fixed exchange rate, * p and p the foreign and domestic price of the consumption goods, respectively, and q and ) 1 ( q − the proportions of domestic and foreign goods over total consumption.
Since this is a semi-small open economy, the price of import goods and foreign assets are exogenous but the price of the export good is domestically set.
On the production side, we assume that domestic output is produced by a two factor neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale, which can be written as
normalizing labor input to unity, where Y is domestic output and K the stock of capital. Output equals the sum of private and government consumption, net exports and investment.
For simplicity, we assume that capital and government bonds are owned entirely by domestic residents. External bonds pay an exogenously given world real interest rate, r * . International capital markets are perfect and uncovered interest parity holds at all times. The monetary authorities adopt policies to sustain the fixed exchange rate regime and finance current account imbalances through changes in foreign reserves. Trend monetary growth is set to zero for analytical convenience.
We can write the aggregate relationships as follows: The aggregate consumption function (1) is a linear function of total wealth. This is a straightforward implication of the assumed logarithmic utility function. Note that in a sustainable fixed exchange rate the capital stock is determined by the given world rate r * , assuming for simplicity equal to zero actual and expected inflation. Hence, real In a sustainable fixed exchange rate regime no seignorage revenues are available to the government. Setting (6), as in Burnside et al. (2001) , and integrating it under the constraint implied by (7) we may write the intertemporal budget constraint of the government as
which states that the level of government debt is equal to the present discounted value of future surpluses Since fiscal policy affects demand through the effects on wealth, relative price and consumption, it is convenient, following Blanchard (1985) , to summarize all these effects by the following index ( )
setting, for simplicity, government spending equal to zero on the entire path.
The tax policy rule is assumed to be given by: 
which describes the equation of motion of the fiscal index.
Thus, in order to analyze the dynamic effects of the stated fiscal policy we can rewrite the model, making use of (10) and (11), as
III. FISCAL DEFICITS AND CURRENCY CRISES
In this section we examine the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on the macrovariables of the model to derive the links between expected future budget deficits and currency crises in a pegged exchange rate economy. The policy is centered on a lump-sum tax cut, that is a once and for all increase in Z 5 . Since taxes are modeled as an increasing function of debt, through the α parameter (see equation (9)), the policy considered here is a fiscal deficit at 0 t t = , generated by the tax cut, followed by future surpluses as debt accumulates, so as to always satisfy the intertemporal government budget constraint without recourse to seignorage revenues. 
Short-Run Equilibrium
The effects of government spending in optimizing models can be found in Frankel and Razin (1987) , Obstfeld (1989) , Turnovsky and Sen (1991) . 6 A similar condition can be found in Blanchard (1985) , Buiter (1987) , Matsuyama (1987) , Giovannini (1988) , Kawai and Maccini (1995) , Piersanti (2002) .
where the upper bars indicate long-run effects.
From equations (18) through (25) we can see that an increase in d implies a rise in consumption and real money balances and an appreciation of the real exchange rate, in the short-run; in the steady-state equilibrium consumption, foreign assets and real money balances are, however, below their original levels. The capital stock is unchanged and there is a real exchange rate appreciation.
The dynamics of this economy can be determined by substituting the short-run solution for C , ρ and m into the dynamic equations of the model. The critical equation (15) 
Linearizing around the steady state, for given r * , we obtain
λ is the negative root associated with the stable arm of the saddle path, The remaining dynamic equations of the model are:
Equations (27), (28) and (29) describe the transitional dynamics towards the long-run equilibrium for the capital stock, the real exchange rate and real money balances.
Equations (30) and (31) and 1(c)). The total amount of K and F is predetermined, but not its two components: agents can substitute foreign assets for capital stock instantaneously and exchange them for money. Hence, the domestic real interest rate jumps upwards.
As the economy moves towards its new long-run equilibrium point
the government budget goes from deficit to surplus, non-human wealth, consumption and real money balances decline, foreign assets are run down, while the real exchange rate and the capital stock rise. Since the current account is in deficit during the period of adjustment, foreign assets end up to a lower level in the new steadystate. The capital stock returns back to its original level, K , in the long-run, while foreign assets and human wealth decline. Total real wealth decreases and consumption and real money balances fall below their initial levels. The real exchange rate overshoots and the domestic real interest rate is higher than the world rate during the transition to the steady-state. Thereafter the economy shifts to a flexible exchange rate regime and the money supply becomes exogenous.
The main result of our model of currency crises thus appeals to intuition and can be restated as follows. A rise in current and expected future budget deficits generates both an appreciation of the real exchange rate and current account deficits. Hence, there is a decumulation of foreign reserves along the transitional path to the new steady-state. If reserves approach a critical level in the adjusting process, a speculative attack occurs causing the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime. The next section tests the predictions of the model.
III. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we test the power of our model in predicting financial and currency The specification used in the estimation of our probit model may thus be written as:
where CS is the binary variable (Crisis) and the lagged values for the independent variables encompass the dynamics implied by equation (26). According to our model, we expect that the probability of a crisis be negatively correlated to EFGB , CA , RESR and RRATE , and positively linked to REXA and DCR , so that increases in expected future budget deficits and domestic credit, reductions in the current account, foreign reserves and the domestic real interest rate, or a real exchange rate appreciation raise the probability that a crisis will eventually break up. Equation (26) predicts that the budget and current account deficits should be causally linked. The hypothesis of no causality between the two deficits is strongly rejected by our tests reported in table 2, where it is shown that budget deficits do cause current account deficits. Preliminary tests investigating the stationarity of the time series employed show that we may accept the hypothesis of stationarity (see table 1 ).
The specification of equation (33) We have generated data for EFGB that were used as a proxy for market's expectations of current and future government budget deficit in the estimation of the probit model formulated in (33), by carrying out the static forecast of the econometric equation described in Table   3 .
Probit estimates are presented in table 4. We also report the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the conditional probability of a crisis evaluated at the mean of the data.
We performed all the model estimates with country dummies in order to control for fixed effects.
It can immediately be seen from table 4 that our theoretical model fits the Asian and Latin American crises extremely well. The most striking result is the high statistical significance of the key variables Ê FGB and CA , suggesting that expected future budget deficits and current account deficits do play a critical role in determining crises.
Since the traditional reserves to imports ratio is not regarded as the best measure of the reserves adequacy, we also tried other indicators suggested in the literature, such as the M1 to reserves ratio and the M2 to reserves ratio 11 . We found no statistical significance for these variables. Tests for the presence of interactive effects among the independent variables were equally negative.
In conclusion, the estimates give strong empirical support to the main prediction of our theoretical model, according to which current and expected future budget deficits, current account deficits, foreign reserves, real exchange rate appreciation, domestic credit and domestic real interest rate are the key variables in predicting the onset of currency crises.
We have assessed the power of the above probit model in predicting the likelihood of a crisis. We forecasted the in-sample probability of a crisis for each country and appraised the resulting probability values for the cutoff levels of 0.5 and 0.25. The results of the goodness of fit estimation are reported in table 5.
We also evaluated the in-sample forecasts by three measures of accuracy known as quadratic probability score (QPS), log probability score (LPS) and global squared bias (GSB). Both the QPS and GSB range from 0 to 2, with zero corresponding to perfect accuracy and perfect global calibration, while LPS ranges from 0 to infinity, with zero corresponding to perfect accuracy.
We can see that our model shows both excellent scores and accurate goodness of fit measures from table 5. It correctly calls more than 99% of total observations both at the 
IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have used an optimizing general equilibrium model to investigate the currency crises of 1990's in emerging markets. It is shown that a rise in current and expected future budget deficits generates, during the transition to the steady state, a real exchange rate appreciation and a depletion of foreign reserves, leading up to a currency crisis when reserves decline below a critical level.
The implications of the model are strongly confirmed by probit estimates for a panel of 21 Latin American and Asian countries in the 1990's.
Crises can thus occour even when policies are correctly designed. In particular, prospective seignorage revenues play no role in triggering a crisis, since the intertemporal budget constraint is always satisfied and monetary policy obeys the rules of the game.
The sutainabilty of fixed exchange rate system may require giving up both monetary and fiscal sovereignty. GB and CA denote the ratio of budget deficit to GDP and of current account balance to GDP, respectively.
More detailed definitions and sources of the variables employed are found in the Data Appendix. The single and double asterisks denote a statistical level of significance better than 5 and 1%, respectively. Instrument list: Const., EFGB(-1), CA(-1), REXA(-1), RESR(-1), T, T 2 and 20 country dummies.
Legend:
SE : Standard error of regression. J-statistic: Newey and West(1987b) 
where n is the number of the variables tested.
. R McF
: McFadden R-squared. Probit slope derivatives are expressed in percentage values. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood with a constant and twenty country dummies. The z-statistics uses the robust standard errors estimated by quasimaximum likelihood method. Table 5 In-sample prediction evaluation Accuracy and calibration of forecasts Quadratic probability score (QPS) 0.017328 Log probability score (LPS) 0.030462 Global squared bias (GSB) 0.00000002 QPS :Quadratic probability scores, defined as
Goodness-of-fit
, where t P is the probability forecast generated by the model shown in table 4 for the year t and t P is our binary variable (Crisis) which is equal to 1 if a crisis occurs in the year t and zero otherwise.
LPS : Log probability score, defined as ( ) ( ) ( )
. For a more detailed discussion see Diebold and Lopez (1996) . An observation is classified as "correct" when the predicted probability is less than or equal to the cut-off value and the observed Crisis = 0, or when the predicted probability is greater than the cut-off value and the observed Crisis = 1. Analogously, an observation is classified as "incorrect" when the predicted probability is greater than the cut-off level and the observed Crisis=0, or when the predicted probability is less than or equal to the cut-off level and the observed Crisis=1 . 
B -MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX -B.I) Short-run and long-run equilibrium
The short-run macroeconomic equilibrium is obtained by combining the aggregate consumption equation (1) together with equation (2) and the product market equilibrium condition
These equation can be solved for ρ ,
C
and m obtaining equations (18)- (20) in the text.
The partial derivatives are 
The long-run equilibrium is reached when
by equations (12)- (17). The partial derivatives reported in (21)- (25) are obtained as The stability conditions, however, do not change if we drop the restriction
In the more general case, the linear approximation of the five dimensional system in
and ρ & in the vicinity of the steady-state has the following matrix 
